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INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

JUNE 24, 2019

(U) Audit of the Distribution of Preferred Munitions in Support of the Republic of Korea

Classified By: Troy M. Meyer,
Principal Deputy Inspector General for Audit
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Declassify On: 20440020

INTEGRITY ★ INDEPENDENCE ★ EXCELLENCE

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Results in Brief

(U) Audit of the Distribution of Preferred Munitions in Support of the Republic of Korea

(U) June 24, 2019

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this audit was to determine whether the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) had a distribution network to deliver and receive preferred munitions in support of operation plan (OPLAN) requirements.

(S) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

(U) Background

(U) USINDOPACOM, a combatant command, is responsible for anticipating and planning for military contingencies within its assigned area of responsibility. USINDOPACOM officials develop OPLANs to identify contingency-specific scenarios and assumptions, and the resources needed to address those anticipated contingencies.

(S) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

Background (cont'd)

(S) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

(S) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

(U) USTRANSCOM is responsible for scheduling and delivering munitions within the timeframes identified in the time-phased force and deployment data.

The Department of Transportation Maritime Administration provides sealift (movement of cargo by ship) using the National Defense Reserve Fleet, which includes Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships.

(U) RRF ships are available for activation to support initial USTRANSCOM sealift requirements. The RRF contains Roll-on/Roll-Off ships, designated for moving unit equipment, and special capability ships. Special capability ships include crane ships, which are configured to carry munitions. DoD OIG: (b)(1), 1.7(e)



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Results in Brief

(U) Audit of the Distribution of Preferred Munitions in Support of the Republic of Korea

Background (cont'd)

(U) Munitions will also be transported by commercial ships through the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA). VISA is a Department of Transportation agreement with the maritime industry and the DoD to make transportation services, including ships, equipment, and management services, available to the DoD as required to support the emergency deployment and sustainment of U.S. forces. After VISA activation, these ships would offload any commercial cargo, and transit to the port of embarkation.

(S//NF) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

(U) Finding

(S//NF) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

• (S//NF) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

(S//NF) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

• (S//NF) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

(S//NF) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

(U) Since June 2018, the SDDC and the DoD OIG: (b)(7)(E) have taken action to address the deficiencies that limited loading and offloading of munitions at DoD OIG: (b)(7)(E). Specifically, DoD OIG: (b)(7)(E), TRANSCOM: (b)(5)

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Results in Brief

(U) Audit of the Distribution of Preferred Munitions in Support of the Republic of Korea

(U) Recommendations

(U) Among other things, we recommend that the SDDC Commanding General and the DoD OIG: (b)(7)(E)

DoD OIG: (b)(7)(E) Commander:

- (U) complete ongoing management actions to resolve container-handling equipment limitations affecting munitions loading at DoD OIG: (b)(7)(E), and
- (U) conduct terminal analyses periodically (for example, when issues arise that would impact loading capabilities) to determine whether DoD OIG: (b)(7)(E) munitions-loading capability supports USINDOPACOM requirements.

(U) In addition, we recommend that the Director of USTRANSCOM Operations and Plans Directorate (J3), perform a review to determine alternative sealift capacity on the west coast needed to support the OPLAN in the event that designated ships are not available to transport munitions.

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

~~(S//NF)~~ The USTRANSCOM Chief of Staff disagreed with our finding and recommendations. [REDACTED]

INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

(U) The USTRANSCOM Chief of Staff disagreed with our recommendation to conduct terminal analyses periodically. As a result of management comments, we revised our recommendation to state that terminal analyses should be conducted when a change in conditions impacts munitions loading capabilities. The Chief of Staff stated that the SDDC updates its terminal analysis whenever infrastructure, resources, terminal processes, or their modeling tools are updated. We disagree that the SDDC has updated terminal analysis when conditions changed. Specifically, we determined that the SDDC did not update its DoD OIG: (b)(7)(E) terminal analysis between 2011 and 2018, when there were labor and equipment changes. Therefore, the recommendation remains unresolved. We request that the USTRANSCOM Chief of Staff provide additional comments in response to the final report identifying specific actions to direct the SDDC to conduct terminal analyses when a change in conditions impacts munitions loading capabilities.

~~(S//NF)~~ The USTRANSCOM Chief of Staff disagreed with the recommendation to perform a sealift capacity review and stated DoD OIG: (b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

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Results in Brief

(U) Audit of the Distribution of Preferred Munitions in Support of the Republic of Korea

Comments (cont'd)

(S//NF) NDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

(U) We request that the Chief of Staff provide additional comments in response to the final report. Comments should identify specific actions USTRANSCOM will take to determine alternative sealift capacity on the west coast in the event that designated ships in reduced operating status-5 are not available to transport munitions.

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of recommendations.

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(U) Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
(U) Commanding General, Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command	1b	1a	None
(U) Director, U.S. Transportation Command, Operations and Plans Directorate (TCJ3)	3	None	None
(U) Director, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Logistics Directorate (J4)	2	None	None
(U) Director, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Plans Directorate (J5)	2	None	None
(U) Commander, DoD OIG (b)(7)(E) DoD OIG (b)(7)(E)	1b	1a	None

(U) Please provide Management Comments by July 24, 2019.

(U) The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations:

- (U) **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- (U) **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- (U) **Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

(U) June 24, 2019

(U) MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES KOREA
COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND


(U) SUBJECT: Audit of the Distribution of Preferred Munitions in Support of
the Republic of Korea (Report No. DODIG-2019-099)

(U) We are providing this report for your review and comment. We conducted this
audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

(U) DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly.
We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing the
final report. Comments from the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Chief of Staff partially
addressed Recommendation 2. Therefore, we request additional comments from the
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Chief of Staff on Recommendation 2. Comments from the
U.S. Transportation Command Chief of Staff partially addressed Recommendations 1.b
and 3. Therefore, we request additional comments from the U.S. Transportation
Command Chief of Staff; the Director, U.S. Transportation Command, Operations and
Plans Directorate (TCJ3); or the Commander, DoD OIG (b)(7)(E) on
Recommendations 1.b and 3. Comments from the U.S. Transportation Command Chief
of Staff addressed all specifics of Recommendation 1.a and conformed to the
requirements of DoD Instruction 7650.03; therefore, we do not require additional
comments on this recommendation.

(U) Please send a PDF file containing your comments to audrgo@dodig.mil by
July 24, 2019. Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the
authorizing official for your organization. We cannot accept the /Signed/ symbol in
place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically,
you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

(U) We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the audit. Please
direct questions to me at DoD OIG (b)(6).


Troy M. Meyer
Principal Assistant Inspector General
for Audit

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this audit was to determine whether the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) had a distribution network to deliver and receive preferred munitions in support of operation plan (OPLAN) requirements.¹

(S) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

(U) Background

(U) U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

(U) USINDOPACOM is one of six geographic combatant commands of the U.S. Armed Forces. The USINDOPACOM mission is to enhance stability in the Indo-Pacific region by promoting security cooperation and responding to contingencies. USINDOPACOM is supported by the following subordinate commands.

- (U) Component Commands:
 - (U) Pacific Fleet
 - (U) Pacific Air Forces
 - (U) Army Pacific
 - (U) Marine Forces Pacific

¹ (U) In May 2018, the Secretary of Defense renamed the U.S. Pacific Command the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

² (S) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)




³ (S) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)


- (U) Sub-unified Commands:
 - (U) USFK
 - (U) U.S. Forces Japan
 - (U) Special Operations Command Pacific

(U) Combatant Command Operation Plans

(U) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has specific responsibilities in strategic direction, campaign and contingency planning, joint doctrine, and joint education and training. The Joint Staff provides policy and guidance, oversees joint logistics matters, and supports and assists combatant commands in planning for contingencies. Combatant command officials develop OPLANs to identify contingency-specific scenarios, assumptions, and the resources needed to address anticipated contingencies. OPLANs include time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) that identify when and where the commander's requirements are needed.⁴

 (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

-  (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)
-  (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)
-  (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

 (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

⁴ (U) The TPFDD is the database portion of an OPLAN that contains time-phased force data, cargo and personnel data, and movement data for an OPLAN. These data contain all combat and support requirements, including aggregate-level movement timeframes of munitions.

⁵ (U) The RRF, established under the National Defense Reserve Fleet, is a key element of strategic sealift that transports military unit equipment during the initial surge for U.S. forces deploying anywhere in the world.

(U) Requirements for Preferred Munitions

(U) Preferred munitions are munitions identified by the Military Service Components as critical to the successful execution of the OPLAN and are needed to meet combatant command warfighting objectives. The USINDOPACOM Commander stated in his April 2017 testimony that shortages of preferred munitions, such as small diameter bombs, are a top warfighting concern that impacts combat readiness.⁶

(U) Each Military Service must identify the total number of munitions required to arm its weapon systems and forces to perform its assigned mission. The Military Services use munitions models, intelligence, threat reports, and targeting priorities to determine the number and combination of preferred munitions they require to meet OPLAN warfighting objectives.

(U) Joint Munitions Distribution

(U) The joint munitions distribution system consists of storage sites in CONUS and prepositioned munitions afloat and stored in allied countries. The joint munitions distribution system also includes transportation assets (containers, railcars, aircraft, and ships) needed to move munitions from storage sites to required destinations using infrastructure, such as railways, roads, airports, and seaports.

(S//NF) USINDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Roles and Responsibilities for Munitions Distribution in USINDOPACOM

(U) The USINDOPACOM munitions distribution network includes the Joint Munitions Command, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and its Component Commands, and the Department of Transportation Maritime Administration.

⁶ (U) USINDOPACOM (then U.S. Pacific Command) Commander, testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on April 26, 2017.

(U) Joint Munitions Command

(U) The Joint Munitions Command manages all U.S. munitions depots and industrial-based facilities that maintain munitions inventory, provides munitions to meet current mission requirements, and manages the ability to surge munitions production as required. The Joint Munitions Command receives, stores, issues, and distributes munitions in support of combatant commands and OPLANs.

(U) The Joint Munitions Command is responsible for providing joint forces with munitions at the right place and time to support global operations. After a Service Component identifies a munitions requirement, the Joint Munitions Command determines the sourcing location for all munitions required by the Service Components, based on available inventories.

(U) U.S. Transportation Command

(U) USTRANSCOM is a unified, functional combatant command that provides strategic transportation support to USINDOPACOM, other combatant commands, the Military Services, Defense agencies, and other Government organizations. USTRANSCOM directs and supervises the military distribution network. To meet OPLAN requirements, USTRANSCOM works with USINDOPACOM and the Military Services to deliver the correct types and amounts of preferred munitions to the ROK within the required timeframe.

(U) USTRANSCOM planners schedule and forecast the delivery of resources identified within an OPLAN, determine transportation feasibility, and plan the distribution of munitions. Using the transportation resources available, USTRANSCOM planners create a schedule and coordinate with agencies involved in the distribution network to deliver munitions globally.

(U) Component Commands

(U) To execute its mission, USTRANSCOM has three Component Commands that provide land, sea, and air transportation for the DoD:

- (U) Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC),
- (U) Military Sealift Command (MSC), and
- (U) Air Mobility Command.

(U) Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command

(U) The SDDC plans and executes surface delivery of equipment and supplies for the DoD. Specifically, the SDDC:

- (U) directs, controls, and supervises CONUS-based surface transportation;
- (U) arranges ocean transportation with the MSC;
- (U) recommends ports of embarkation and ports of debarkation in coordination with the combatant commands;
- (U) supports the movement of munitions from CONUS depots to ports of embarkation by truck or rail; and
- (U) performs munitions terminal operations at DoD OIG: (b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Military Sealift Command

~~(S)~~ The MSC manages ships that provide transportation for DoD sealift requirements. Sealift is the principal means of delivering munitions, equipment, and logistic support to forces. INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

(U) The MSC also manages several types of ships that distribute munitions to the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility, including U.S. Government-owned ships, chartered U.S. flag ships, and ships activated from the Maritime Administration RRF. The MSC uses ships for special missions, sealift from CONUS, and prepositioned munitions.

~~(S)~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Air Mobility Command

~~(S)~~ Air Mobility Command provides rapid, global, strategic airlift and sustainment for U.S. forces. INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

⁷ (U) Net explosive weight is the weight of a munition in pounds of explosive material. Net explosive weight is used to determine separation distances from explosives to nearby structures and areas where personnel could be present.

(U) Maritime Administration

(S) The Department of Transportation Maritime Administration provides sealift support using the National Defense Reserve Fleet, which includes RRF ships.⁸ The Maritime Administration RRF ships are available for activation to support USTRANSCOM sealift requirements. [REDACTED] (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

(S) [REDACTED] (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

(U) Munitions will also be transported by commercial ships through the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA). VISA is a Department of Transportation agreement with the maritime industry and the DoD to make transportation services, including ships, equipment, and management services, available to the DoD as required to support the emergency deployment and sustainment of U.S. forces.

(U) VISA commercial participants will be given the first opportunity to meet DoD contingency sealift requirements. When voluntary commercial capacity does not meet DoD contingency requirements, the DoD will activate VISA in stages, as necessary, and select ships to satisfy operational requirements that cannot be met by commercial shipping.¹¹ VISA provides for the staged, time-phased availability of commercial shipping services to meet DoD contingency requirements. To successfully execute VISA and plan shipping capacity, USTRANSCOM requires defined, time-phased distribution requirements from combatant commands and the Military Service Components.

⁸ (U) The National Defense Reserve Fleet is the Maritime Administration's reserve of ships for national defense and national emergencies. The 2008 "Memorandum of Agreement between Department of Defense and Department of Transportation" identifies the relationship and responsibilities of both departments in the administration of the National Defense Reserve Fleet program.

⁹ (U) Turbo activations are the no-notice activation exercises for ships, designed to test the ships through sea trials, safety checks, and compliance reviews.

¹⁰ (U) In the interest of national defense, the MSC Commander has authority to waive ship compliance with navigation and inspection laws for specific missions of ships operated by or chartered to the MSC.

¹¹ (U) VISA has three stages that are activated at different times. Stage I is activated when voluntary capacity is insufficient. Stage II is activated when contingency requirements exceed the capabilities of stage I; and stage III is activated when contingency requirements exceed the capability of stage II.

(S) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g); TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

(U) Munitions Distribution to the ROK

(S) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g); TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

(U) Prepositioning Distribution to the ROK

(S) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g); TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

(U) CONUS Distribution to the ROK

(U) The SDDC manages and oversees the ground transportation from CONUS munitions depots to military ocean terminals on the east and west coasts. After munitions arrive at [REDACTED] DoD OIG: (b)(7)(E) by truck or rail, the SDDC uses rail crews and container-handling equipment to stage munitions prior to loading. The SDDC and contracted crane operators then load munitions containers on ships.¹²

(U) After munitions containers are loaded, the MSC manages the shipment to the port of debarkation in the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility, including protection and safety of the cargo. The MSC uses arrival reports to organize dates, times, and required support services at the port of debarkation.

¹² (U) [REDACTED] DoD OIG: (b)(7)(E)

(S) Table 1 summarizes the expected timeline for munitions distribution from CONUS storage locations to the port of debarkation in the ROK. INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

(U) Table 1. Munitions Delivery Timeline for Initial Resupply from CONUS to the ROK
INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

(U) Source: DoD OIG (b)(7)(E)

(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

¹³ (S) INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

(U) Review of Internal Controls

~~(S//NF)~~ DoD Instruction 5010.40 requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls.¹⁴ We identified internal control weaknesses in this report. USINDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), USTRANSCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)


[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

We will provide a copy of the final report to the senior official responsible for internal controls in USINDOPACOM and USTRANSCOM.


¹⁴ (U) DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures," May 30, 2013.


(U) Finding


~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)




~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)



- ~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)
- 

- ~~(S)~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)
- 

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)



(S//NF) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Appendix B provides more information on ^{DoD OIG}_{(b)(7)(E)} preferred munitions classes, including munitions inventories and the percentage of munitions requirements in inventory.

(S//NF) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Insufficient Rail Crews and Container-handling Equipment

(S//NF) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

Specific ^{DoD OIG:}_{(b)(7)(E)} rail crew

and container-handling equipment limitations are detailed below.

- (U) Rail Crews and Network: ^{DoD OIG:}_{(b)(7)(E)} [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

¹⁵ (U) Container handlers are used to handle, lift, move, stack and unstack standard shipping containers.

¹⁶ (U) Rail switching refers to the short-distance movement of rail cars around the installation.

- (U) Container-Handling Equipment: DoD OIG: (b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(U) Management Actions Taken and Planned

(U) The SDDC and DoD OIG: (b)(7)(E) have taken action to address the munitions-loading limitations. Planned and ongoing rail and container-handling equipment improvements are detailed below.

- (U) Rail Crews and Network: DoD OIG: (b)(7)(E), TRANSCOM: (b)(5)

[REDACTED]

- (U) Container-Handling Equipment: DoD OIG: (b)(7)(E), TRANSCOM: (b)(5)

[REDACTED]

(U) USINDOPACOM Response to Management Actions Taken

(S//NF) USINDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

¹⁷ (S//NF) USINDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

¹⁸ (S//NF) USINDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM. (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM. (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM. (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM. (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Detailed TPFDD munitions requirements are needed for transportation planners to schedule, allocate, and invest in munitions distribution resources. For example,

DoD OIG. (b)(7)(E), TRANSCOM. (b)(5)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Therefore, USINDOPACOM officials, in coordination with their Military Service Components, should update munitions delivery requirements for USTRANSCOM, including detailed munitions data for the TPFDD and minimum loading requirement at ^{DoD OIG}(b)(7)(E) to meet USINDOPACOM OPLAN resupply requirements.

(U) Ships Were Not Always Available

(S//NF) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)
[Redacted text block]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)
[Redacted text block]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)
[Redacted text block]

¹⁹ (U) Reduced operating status-5 refers to ships that must be activated and ready to load cargo within 5 days of activation notice.

²⁰ (S//NF) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)
[Redacted text block]

(S) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

(S) [REDACTED] INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

(U) We analyzed the results of 32 turbo activation exercises conducted between December 2015 (Turbo Activation 16-01) and May 2018 (Turbo Activation 18-03) to determine whether the ships that were tested were ready to load cargo within 5 days of the activation notice.²¹ The turbo activations we analyzed included the 3 RRF crane ships, 1 of the secondary MSC surge fleet ships, and 24 additional RRF and MSC ships that could be used to carry munitions.²² The three RRF crane ships and the MSC surge fleet ship successfully met the 5-day readiness requirement. However, of the additional 24 RRF and MSC surge fleet ships tested, 16 did not meet the 5-day readiness requirement, as shown in Table 2.

(U) *Table 2. Turbo Activation Exercise Results From December 2015 Through May 2018*

(U) Organization	Number of Ships Tested	Number of Ships That Did Not Meet 5-Day Readiness Requirement
Maritime Administration	20	12
MSC	8	4
Total	28	16

(U)

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

²¹ (U) Because of the readiness nature of this audit, we reported whether ships met the 5-day readiness requirement after activation. We did not make a conclusion about the turbo activations as a whole, which also test safety, logistics compliance, and sea trials. The turbo activation results in Table 2 may differ from USTRANSCOM, MSC, and Maritime Administration turbo activation scorecards because readiness timelines comprise only 10 percent of the total score.

²² (U) Two RRF and two MSC ships were tested twice during this period.

(S//NF) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

(S) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]


(S//NF) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]


²³ (S//NF) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)




~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)



(U) Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response


(U) U.S. Transportation Command Chief of Staff Comments on  Requirements

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)



(U) Our Response


~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)



(U) In addition, we added information under the *USINDOPACOM Response to Management Actions Taken*, section of this report to show the importance of having a well-defined munitions container requirement at ^{DoD OIG} (b)(7)(E). Despite unclear combatant command requirements, USTRANSCOM should continue moving forward to complete its actions addressing loading limitations at ^{DoD OIG} (b)(7)(E) and conduct terminal analyses to assess loading capabilities.


(U) U.S. Transportation Command Chief of Staff Comments on Sealift Capacity

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)



(U) Our Response

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)



(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Revised Recommendations

(U) As a result of management comments, we revised draft recommendation 1.b. to clarify the frequency of the actions needed to update ^{DoD OIG} (b)(7)(E) loading capabilities.

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Commanding General of the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command and the Commander of the DoD OIG (b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]:

- a. **(U) Complete ongoing management actions to resolve container-handling equipment limitations affecting munitions loading at** DoD OIG (b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED].

(U) U.S. Transportation Command Chief of Staff Comments

~~(S//NF)~~ The USTRANSCOM Chief of Staff disagreed with the recommendation and stated that, INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g), (b)(5)

[REDACTED].

(U) Our Response

(U) Although the USTRANSCOM Chief of Staff disagreed with the recommendation,

DoD OIG: (b)(1), 1.7(e)

[REDACTED] meet the intent of the recommendation. The recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once DoD OIG: (b)(1), 1.7(e), TRANSCOM: (b)(5)

[REDACTED].

- b. **(U) Conduct a new terminal analysis periodically (for example, when issues arise that would impact loading capabilities) to determine whether** DoD OIG: (b)(7)(E) **munitions-loading capability supports U.S. Indo-Pacific Command requirements.**

(U) U.S. Transportation Command Chief of Staff Comments

(U) The USTRANSCOM Chief of Staff disagreed with the recommendation and stated that analysis to determine DoD OIG: (b)(7)(E) **loading capabilities is a conditions-based requirement, not a calendar-based requirement. The Chief of Staff also stated that the SDDC updates its terminal analysis whenever infrastructure, resources, terminal processes, or modeling tool(s) are updated.**

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Chief of Staff did not address the specifics of the recommendation. We agree that the required analysis to determine DoD OIG (b) (7)(E) loading capabilities should be conditions-based and not calendar-based, and we revised the recommendation. However, we disagree that the SDDC updates or has updated its terminal analysis when conditions changed. Specifically, we determined that the SDDC did not update its DoD OIG (b) (7)(E) terminal analysis between 2011 and 2018, despite labor and equipment changes that impacted loading capabilities. Therefore, the recommendation remains unresolved. We ask that the USTRANSCOM Chief of Staff provide additional comments in response to the final report, identifying specific actions to direct the SDDC to conduct terminal analyses when conditions change that impact munitions loading capabilities.

(U) Recommendation 2

(U) We recommend that the Directors of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Logistics and Plans Directorates (J4 and J5), in coordination with their Military Service Component Commands, update munitions delivery requirements for U.S. Transportation Command, including detailed munitions data for the time-phased force and deployment data and minimum loading requirement at DoD OIG (b) (7)(E), to meet U.S. Indo-Pacific Command operation plan resupply requirements.

(U) U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Chief of Staff Comments

(U) The USINDOPACOM Chief of Staff agreed with the recommendation and stated that USINDOPACOM continues to review and update TPFDD requirements in support of OPLANs. The Chief of Staff also stated that USINDOPACOM will conduct a workshop in May 2019 to inform all key stakeholders of munitions requirements based on current conditions.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the USINDOPACOM Chief of Staff did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. Specifically, the Chief of Staff did not indicate whether the updates to the TPFDD will have the level of detail (for example specific munitions type and quantities required in each shipment) needed by USTRANSCOM planners to schedule, allocate, and invest in munitions distribution resources. USTRANSCOM planners need this information to determine the minimum loading requirements at DoD OIG (b) (7)(E) to support USINDOPACOM OPLAN requirements. We ask that the Chief of Staff provide additional comments in response to the final report, identifying actions to be taken by USINDOPACOM J4, J5, and Military Service Components to update the required details in the TPFDD.

(U) Recommendation 3

(U) We recommend that the Director of the U.S. Transportation Command Operations and Plans Directorate (J3) perform a review to determine alternative sealift capacity on the west coast needed to support the operations plan in the event that designated ships are not available to transport munitions.

(U) U.S. Transportation Command Chief of Staff Comments

~~(S//NF)~~ The USTRANSCOM Chief of Staff disagreed with the recommendation and stated [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

~~(S//NF)~~ Comments from the Chief of staff did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this performance audit from February 2018 through March 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(U) Our audit focused on the munitions distribution process during the initial resupply, distribution network of preferred munitions from ports of embarkation in CONUS to the ports of debarkation in the ROK.

(U) We obtained and reviewed the following documents from USINDOPACOM, USFK, and USTRANSCOM.

- ~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- ~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)
[REDACTED]
- ~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)
[REDACTED]
- ~~(S)~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)
[REDACTED]
- (U) Turbo activation exercise results, December 2015 to May 2018
- (U) USTRANSCOM Munitions Distribution Timeline from munitions depots in CONUS to munitions depots in the ROK
- ~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g); TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)
[REDACTED]
- (U) Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation, August 8, 2008

(S) USINDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) We obtained and reviewed the USTRANSCOM Turbo Activation Exercise Directive, April 9, 2017, to determine the methodology used to measure the 5-day activation requirement during turbo activation exercises. We analyzed turbo activation scorecards only to determine whether total activation timelines were met, based on the established guidelines. We did not make a conclusion on the turbo activations as a whole, which also test safety, logistics compliance, and sea trials.

(U) We visited the following locations and interviewed the following personnel between March and July 2018.

- (U) USINDOPACOM Logistics and Plans Directorates, Camp Smith, Hawaii; and USINDOPACOM Component Commands–Pacific Air Forces at Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam, Hawaii; Army Pacific at Fort Shafter, Hawaii; Marine Forces Pacific at Camp Smith, Hawaii; and Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
- (U) USFK Logistics, Transportation, Safety, and Plans and Exercises Directorates, and USFK Component Commands: 7th Air Force, 8th Army, 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, and Marine Forces Korea at Yongsan, South Korea
- (U) USTRANSCOM and its Component Commands: SDDC, at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, and the MSC, at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia
- (U) DoD OIG: (b)(7)(E) [REDACTED]
- (U) U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration in Washington, D.C.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We used computer-processed data for this audit. USFK officials provided Excel spreadsheets used to track the amount and type of preferred munitions in the ROK. USFK officials informed us that the Military Service Components provided the preferred munitions inventory data in Excel spreadsheets. Specifically, each Military Service Component tracks its preferred munitions inventory in separate systems, which it then individually provides to the USFK to update its records. The Air Force uses the Combat Ammunition System, the Navy and the Marine Corps use the Ordnance Information System, and the Army uses the National Level Ammunition Capability System.

(U) We performed tests on the reliability of the data in the preferred munitions inventory Excel spreadsheets from USFK officials. We reviewed and compared the type and amount of preferred munitions listed on the USFK Excel spreadsheet to the inventory supporting documents provided by each Military Service Component. We found that the amount and type of preferred munitions listed on the USFK's spreadsheet were consistent with the data listed on the Military Service Components' inventory supporting documents. We also interviewed Military Service Component personnel responsible for compiling the munitions inventory data to understand the controls over the systems used to extract the data and to corroborate results of our inventory tests. Therefore, we determined that the information that the USFK provided was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our audit.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office issued one audit report related to Navy Sealift ships. Unrestricted Government Accountability Office reports can be accessed at <https://www.gao.gov/products/>.

(U) GAO


(U) Report No. GAO-17-503, "Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Maintain Viable Surge Sealift and Combat Logistics Fleets," August 2017

(U) The Government Accountability Office evaluated the Navy's surge sealift fleet to determine readiness trends and to evaluate Navy plans to address the aging surge sealift fleet. The Government Accountability Office found that the readiness of the surge sealift fleet has trended downward over the last 5 years, as shown by increasing equipment casualties and decreasing scores on activation exercises.


(U) Appendix B

(U) USFK Preferred Munitions Requirements and Inventories

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

A series of five horizontal black bars of varying lengths, redacting text in the first section of the document.

INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

A large rectangular black box covering the majority of the page, redacting the main body of the document.

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

CONUS	Continental United States
DoD OIG (b)(7)(F)	DoD OIG (b)(7)(E)
MSC	Military Sealift Command
OPLAN	Operation Plan
ROS-5	Reduced Operating Status-5
RRF	Ready Reserve Force
ROK	Republic of Korea
SDDC	Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
USFK	U.S. Forces Korea
USINDOPACOM	U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
USTRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command
VISA	Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement

(U) List of Classified Sources

Source 1: ~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

~~(S//NF)~~ (Document classified SECRET//NOFORN)

Declassification Date: August 8, 2041

Generated Date: August 9, 2016

Source 2: ~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

~~(S//NF)~~ (Document classified SECRET)

Declassification Date: August 8, 2041

Generated Date: July 15, 2016

Source 3: ~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

~~(S//NF)~~ (Document classified SECRET//NOFORN)

Declassification Date: August 8, 2041

Generated Date: June 29, 2015

Source 4: ~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

~~(S//NF)~~ (Document classified SECRET//NOFORN)

Declassification Date: August 1, 2037

Generated Date: August 1, 2012

Source 5: ~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

~~(S//NF)~~ (Document classified SECRET//NOFORN)

Declassification Date: May 31, 2038

Generated Date: May 31, 2013

Source 6: ~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

~~(S//NF)~~ (Document classified SECRET//NOFORN)

Declassification Date: May 31, 2038

Generated Date: June 19, 2018

Source 7: ~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g)

~~(S//NF)~~ (Document classified SECRET)

Declassification Date: August 23, 2036

Generated Date: August 23, 2011

List of Classified Sources

Source 8: (~~SECRET//NOFORN~~) [REDACTED] (Document classified SECRET//NOFORN)

Declassification Date: September 17, 2041

Generated Date: September 17, 2018

Source 9: (~~JOINT SECRET KOR USA~~) [REDACTED] (Document classified JOINT SECRET KOR USA)

Declassification Date: August 27, 2041

Generated Date: August 27, 2018

(U) Management Comments

(U) U.S. Indo-Pacific Command



COMMANDER, U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND
(USINDOPACOM)
CAMP H M SMITH, HAWAII 96861-4028

April 4, 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR DoD OIG (b)(6), DOD IG, DoD OIG (b)(6)
READINESS AND GLOBAL OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: (U) Response to Audit of The Distribution Of Preferred Munitions in Support of The Republic Of Korea (project no. D2018-D000RG-0104.000)

References: (a) (U) Memorandum for Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, March 7, 2019
(b) (U) Audit of the Distribution of Preferred Munitions in Support of the Republic of Korea Project No. D2018-D000RG-0104.000

1. (U) Thank you for the opportunity to review the Audit of the Distribution of Preferred Munitions in Support of the Republic of Korea. We concur with the recommendations pertaining to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM).
2. (U) USINDOPACOM continues to review and update time-phased force and deployment data requirements in support of operational plans. As part of these reoccurring reviews INDOPACOM will execute a workshop in May 2019 to inform all key stakeholders of munitions requirements based on current conditions. Additionally, USINDOPACOM constantly monitors the status of preferred munitions, as well as the risk to OPLAN execution arising from reallocation due to competing global requirements, in recognition of the lack of long-term policy for the Services to maintain more than 30 days of supply.

MICHAEL A. MINIHAN
Major General, U.S. Air Force
Chief of Staff

Attachment:

(U) Draft Report Distribution of Preferred Munitions in Support of the Republic of Korea, with correction (S//NF)

cc:
J4
J5
J004

Classified By: DoD OIG (b)(6), Readiness and Global Operations
Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Unclassified when separated from classified attachment

(U) U.S. Transportation Command (cont'd)

2

**(U) Draft Report, "Audit of the Distribution of Preferred Munitions in Support of the Republic of Korea, dated Mar 2019
(Project No. D2018-D000RG-0104.000)**

1. (U) **Recommendation 1:** We recommend that the Commanding General of the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command and the Commander of the DoD OIG (b)(7)(E)

a. (U) Complete ongoing management actions to resolve container-handling equipment limitations affecting munitions loading at DoD OIG (b)(7)(E)

USTRANSCOM Response: Nonconcur. INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (c)

b. (U) Conduct a new terminal analysis periodically (for example, annually) to determine whether DoD OIG (b)(7)(E) munitions-loading capability supports U.S. Indo-Pacific Command requirements.

(U) **USTRANSCOM Response:** Nonconcur. Analysis to validate DoD OIG (b)(7)(E) throughput capabilities is a conditions-based requirement (not calendar-based). SDDC updates MOT terminal analysis whenever infrastructure, resources or terminal processes change, or whenever substantial improvements are made to supporting modeling tool(s).

2. (U) **Recommendation 2:** We recommend that the Commanders of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Logistics and Plans Directorates (J4 and J5), in coordination with their Military Service Component Commands, update munitions delivery requirements for U.S. Transportation Command, including detailed munitions data for the time-phased force and deployment data and minimum loading requirement at DoD OIG (b)(7)(E), to meet U.S. Indo-Pacific Command operation plan resupply requirements.

(U) **USTRANSCOM Response:** No Comment.

3. (U) **Recommendation 3:** We recommend that the Director of the U.S. Transportation Command Operations and Plans Directorate (J3) perform a review to determine alternative sealift capacity on the west coast needed to support the operations plan in the event that designated ships are not available to transport munitions.

We revised this recommendation in the report. See report pages 21 and 22.

(U) U.S. Transportation Command (cont'd)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

3

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ USTRANSCOM Response: NonConcur. ~~NOORACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

We added additional information in the report regarding the VISA program. See pages ii, 7, 8, and 16.

(U) U.S. Transportation Command (cont'd)

**DODIG DRAFT REPORT DISTRIBUTION OF PREFERRED MUNITIONS IN SUPPORT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
MARCH 17, 2019 PROJECT NO. D2018-D000RG-0104.000**

USTRANSCOM COMMENTS TO PERTINENT FINDINGS

1. **Finding:** INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

a. **USTRANSCOM RESPONSE:** This finding supports Recommendations 1a and 1b.
INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

1) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

2) INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

3) (U) USTRANSCOM is pursuing the intent of Recommendations 1a and 1b. ^{(b)(7)(E)}

Analysis to validate ^{(b)(7)(E)} throughput capabilities is a conditions-based requirement (not calendar-based). Terminal analysis is updated whenever infrastructure / resources change or whenever substantial improvements are made to the supporting modeling tool(s).

2. **Finding:** INDOPACOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM: (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

We added additional information in the report to show the importance of having a well-defined munitions container requirement. See report page 15.

We revised this recommendation in the report. See report pages 21 and 22.

We added additional information in the report regarding the VISA program. See pages ii, 7, 8, and 16.

(U) U.S. Transportation Command (cont'd)

USTRANSCOM RESPONSE: This finding supports Recommendation 3:
INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

1) INDOPACOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (d), (e), (g), TRANSCOM (b)(1), 1.4(a), (g)

2) (U) VISA is a Department of Transportation (DoT) / DoD Emergency Preparedness Program that includes nearly every vessel in the U.S. Flag oceangoing cargo fleet. The VISA program assures USTRANSCOM has sufficient sealift capability to move munitions to support contingency deployment and sustainment of U.S. Military forces. VISA activation would be time-phased to streamline the availability of capacity to coincide with USTRANSCOM movement requirements. There are 62 commercially-owned and operated containers ships in VISA that are certified to carry hazardous cargo and munitions. The VISA program enables USTRANSCOM to move munitions anywhere in the world on short notice, and as needed, retrograde munitions after contingencies.

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

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